The Case for Fonts: The Copyrightability of Font Software in the United States.
Tim Costello | Chief IP Counsel at Monotype
As an IP attorney at a font company, I get a very specific set of reactions when I explain my job. The first is usually some version of: “You need a license for fonts?” The other is usually asking what my favorite font is (shoutout ITC Benguiat®).
By Tim Costello, Chief IP Counsel at Monotype
These questions are fair, but they reveal something telling: even though fonts are everywhere, most people don’t realize how (or why) fonts live at the intersection of creativity and intellectual property law.
This article will examine how fonts came to occupy their current (and often misunderstood) position in U.S. copyright law, and, ultimately, why I believe fonts (the software that renders a typeface on a digital screen) are protectable works under U.S. copyright law.
History of Font Software and U.S. Copyright Law
For more than three decades, U.S. copyright law has made a clear distinction between typeface design and font software. While the visual appearance of letterforms may be largely excluded from copyright protection (at least in the U.S.), the software that enables computers and printers to render those letterforms has garnered levels of protection under U.S. copyright law. That distinction was formalized by the U.S. Copyright Office in its 1992 Final Regulation titled the Registrability of Computer Programs that Generate Typefaces, applied by federal courts in Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Southern Software, Inc., and reflected in decades of registration practice.
Despite this history, recent disputes have raised renewed questions about whether font software should receive copyright protection. Not because the law has changed, but because of shifting interpretations of what constitutes authorship and expression in fonts that are created using modern software tools.
Beginnings of Font Software Protectability
The modern U.S. position pertaining to the protectability of font software originates in the Copyright Office’s 1992 final regulation, Registrability of Computer Programs that Generate Typefaces.That regulation marked a clear departure from the Copyright Office’s earlier 1988 policy decision, which had treated then-existing “typefonts” (similar to bitmap files) as data representations of letterforms rather than expressive software.
However, by 1992, font technology had evolved. Scalable outline fonts using Bézier curves and rendering logic had become standard. In response, the Copyright Office recognized that computer programs designed to generate typefaces could embody original authorship independent of the underlying typeface design. As the Copyright Office explained:
The Copyright Office concluded that such programs should be evaluated under the same originality standard applied to other computer software. Importantly, the Office did not require that originality arise from any particular method of implementation, nor did it require that font software be hand-coded in a traditional programming language. Rather, the relevant question was whether the program incorporated original expression from the author’s instructions.
For nearly thirty years following this regulation, the Copyright Office registered hundreds of font software programs under this framework. This shift in the Copyright Office’s practices reflected the settled understanding that font software should be treated as protected computer code given the expressive nature of decisions implemented by type designers.
Relevant Case Law
Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Southern Software, Inc. (1998)
Fast forward to 1998, when we were introduced to what would become the preeminent font copyright case in the United States: Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Southern Software, Inc.
In this case, Adobe alleged that Southern Software copied its font software programs by replicating the underlying character outline code of Adobe’s fonts. Southern Software argued that font software lacked protectable expression because it was dictated by the shape of the glyphs.
The court rejected Southern Software’s argument after reviewing extensive evidence about the font creation process. The court concluded:
The court emphasized that the creative choices are reflected directly in code:
This reasoning closely tracks the Copyright Office’s 1992 regulation. Both focus on the expressive nature of the decisions made in drafting instructions to machines. The court further explained why originality exists in font software:
In my view, Adobe reflects a straightforward application of the Copyright Office’s 1992 regulation and reinforces the key point that font software can embody protectable expression when it reflects the creative choices of the designer. The law doesn’t turn on whether a designer “hand-codes” every line, but on whether the resulting software reflects human authorship and originality, which is exactly the kind of decision-making that goes into building scalable fonts.
Laatz v. Zazzle (2023)
Almost 25 years later, the font world became enamored with another font case, Laatz v. Zazzle.
In Laatz, Nicky Laatz, a British type designer, alleged claims of copyright infringement (among other things) against the online marketplace Zazzle, for using several of her font software programs titled Blooming Elegant Trio, without proper licensing. The case was recently settled this past May.
These are the two key interpretations that came out of the Laatz case that I believe are either misguided or misunderstood:
The relevance of Adobe to Laatz.
The Laatz court attempted to distinguish Adobe from Laatz by arguing that Adobe’s fonts were created using tools developed internally by Adobe, whereas Laatz used third-party software to translate her creative decisions into code. Therefore, the ruling in Adobe should be distinguished from Laatz.
I disagree that Adobe is distinguishable from Laatz, largely because there is no distinction between proprietary and third-party tools in the Copyright Act, the 1992 Copyright Office regulation, or Adobe. Copyright law has never required that authors also be toolmakers. In the famous copyright case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884), the Supreme Court explained that copyright protects works embodying an author’s “original intellectual conceptions,” even when those conceptions are fixed through a mechanical process (in Burrow-Giles, the mechanical process was a camera). In Burrow-Giles, there was no caveat or requirement which stated a photographer needed to manufacture the camera to enjoy copyright protection for a photograph, like the Laatz court seems to suggest in this ruling.
The Laatz court’s conclusions about whether font software is protected by copyright law.
Laatz contains notable discussions about the nature of font software and its place in U.S. copyright law.
However, one thing is certain: the Laatz court did not hold that fonts lack copyright protection. To the contrary, the court recognized the Copyright Office’s longstanding position that typeface designs themselves are generally not copyrightable, while font software may qualify for copyright protection if it contains sufficient original expression (which is what I believe Adobe explained thoroughly). Although Laatz’s copyright claims were ultimately dismissed prior to settlement, there was no fundamental ruling on the merits of font software copyrightability. Instead, the dismissal largely stemmed from a registration issue. The works at issue were registered as “font data,” but the infringement claims were asserted based on the theory that the works were copyrightable computer programs. Because a valid copyright registration is required before a copyright claim can be brought in federal court, the Laatz court concluded that Laatz could not pursue infringement claims based on the unregistered computer programs. As a result, her copyright claims were dismissed.
My view is that Laatz does not refute Adobe or undermine the Copyright Office’s longstanding position that font software may be protected under copyright law. Rather than rejecting font software on the merits, the decision reflects a procedurally narrow outcome driven by registration accuracy and the mismatch between the registered works and the claims asserted in litigation.
If Laatz had obtained proper registrations for computer programs, the case would likely have turned on the same question Adobe addressed decades ago — whether the font programs reflect sufficient human authorship and creative decision-making, regardless of whether those choices were implemented through editing tools or “hand-coded” line-by-line.
Protecting Human Authorship: Font Software as Creative Expression.
For more than thirty years, U.S. copyright law has recognized that font software may be protected when it reflects original human authorship. To be clear, just like other creative works, I don’t believe a work should garner protection if created solely by a machine. However, tools are meant to be used by artists — painters use paintbrushes, musicians use instruments, and type designers use tools like Glyphs, FontLab, or Fontographer to code the outlines that will be used by a renderer to reproduce each individual character based on their expressive choices.
In my view, refusing to recognize font software as a protectable work reflects a misinterpretation of law and the creative process behind type production. If font creation was purely mechanical, there would be no meaningful differences between fonts that share the same general shapes. There would be no craft, no nuance, and no reason why two designers using the same tools could arrive at different underlying programs that produce visually identical results.
Fonts succeed or fail because designers spend countless hours and make hundreds, if not thousands, of individual creative choices shaping, refining, and engineering the software that makes type work across digital environments. That creative expression is exactly what copyright exists to protect. Font software is not a loophole or a technicality; it is authorship, fixed in code, and it deserves protection accordingly.
Tim Costello is Chief IP Counsel at Monotype.
For a basic understanding of what copyright law means for typeface design and font software, check out this FAQ. To read a more in-depth breakdown on the history, background, and recent developments on this topic, read Update on the application of copyright law to typeface design and font software by Dr. Jan Kaestner, General Counsel at Monotype.
